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Introduction
Despite no mention of political parties in the Constitution, political parties have played a
major role in United States elections, from almost the beginning1 (Jefferson 1898). These parties
act as vehicles to help citizens understand and participate in the political process as well as
express and form political preferences (Koch 2003; Downs 1957).
In some instances, the Constitution is very explicit on the practical considerations related
to running the government. For many other matters, “the founders left a lot of room in terms of
how the actual plumbing would work” (Dubner 2018). When it comes to political parties and the
rules governing their actions, many of the norms and policies have been created by the actors
themselves (Dubner 2018).
Political parties act in order to win office, as well as to further their ideology (LewisBeck Squire 1995. 420; also agreeing with Downs 1957). This party ideology helps citizens form
their own personal political opinions, and the structure of the party acts as a “mentoring”
function to citizens (Koch 2003; 60-61). When it comes to winning office, major political parties
use their power in the policy-making arena to reduce competition from alternate parties (LewisBeck Squire 1995). Parties will also act strategically to advance both their platform (ideology)
and political power (win office) (Lewis-Beck Squire 1995).
Due to the plurality-based elections within single-member districts, the United States is
predisposed towards a two-party system (Duverger 1954). This has certainly been the case when
it comes to presidential elections, as every president since Lincoln in 1860 has been a member of

1

Two political Sects have arisen within the U. S. the one believing that the executive is the branch of our
government which the most needs support; the other that like the analogous branch in the English Government, it
is already too strong for the republican parts of the Constitution; and therefore in equivocal cases they incline to
the legislative powers: the former of these are called federalists…: the latter are styled Republicans, Whigs… etc.
(Jefferson 1898.)
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one of the two major parties. In Utah specifically, recent history shows a dramatic shift to
consistent and high levels of support for the Republican party and candidates. With rare
exception, Republican presidential candidates dominate in Utah. Breaking from a long trend of
higher Republican support, 2016 was the lowest electoral level of support of any Republican
candidate since 1992, and before that 1948 (“Historical Election Results” 2017). Part of this past
success is the increasing level of support from the state’s dominant religion, The Church of
Jesus-Christ of Latter-Day2 Saints, for the Republican party. This trend has become even more
pronounced in the past 50 years (Campbell et al. 2014). Utah County, a major Utah population
center that is also predominantly populated by members of the church, gave Evan McMullin the
highest non-Republican vote share since 1968 (England). With the exception of Ross Perot in
1992, McMullin is the most successful third party candidate in Utah since the Beehive State
obtained statehood in 1896.3
This unusual electoral outcome is clearly a puzzle. To what does candidate Evan
McMullin owe his success in Utah? He did not have the prestige, name recognition, or
significant financial support that has accompanied successful third party candidates in the past.
He was also facing the same disadvantages that any third party candidate in the United States
would face. To properly examine this specific election, I will begin with an analysis of the
position of third parties in US politics and election impacts generally. I will also summarize
what specifically brings about third party success, along with the commensurate challenges
unique to third party campaigns. I will then focus the influence of religion on voting behavior
In accordance with the revised style guide released by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, more
common references to the church and their members such as “LDS” or “Mormon” are not used except in direct
quotations where those phrases are used. Phrases such as “Church of Jesus Christ” and “Latter-Day Saints” will be
used per request of the church (Weaver 2018).
3 Teddy Roosevelt was essentially even with McMullin in 1912 with 21.53%, and Robert Lafollette was also close as
an independent candidate in 1924 with 20.81%.
2
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which has traditionally been examined only through the lens of a two-party structure, and
connect that to Utah specifically with its predominantly Latter-Day Saint population. Using data
from the 2016 BYU exit poll, I will explore possible explanations for McMullin’s success.
Finally, I will examine the relationship between religious affiliation, religious activity, and
support for Evan McMullin in 2016 through a multi-nominal logit model.

History of Third Parties
When the variety and number of political parties increases, the chance of oppression,
factionalism, and non-critical acceptance of ideas decreases.
-James Madison
To say the United States has always been a two party system would be a myth (Lowe
1983; 701). The 19th century was the golden age for third parties, and saw the highest level of
success in campaigning and electing third party candidates to national office. 4
Although there were major and minor parties earlier than the mid 1800s, by the 1840
election, “two party alignments had been established throughout the nation and…within each
region—and in most states—these parties were balanced and competitive (McCormick 1966,
342).
With the 1860 election of Abraham Lincoln as president, the Republican party did what
no other minor party has done since—replaced one of the current major parties (Gillespie 2012,
41). The Republican/Democrat duopoly began in 1860 and has remained to the current day, with
few credible challengers. Only the 1890 Progressive Party, whose platform, candidates, and
voters were largely adopted by the Democrats, and Teddy Roosevelt’s Bull Moose Party have

51 members of the US House of Representatives in 1855 were third party, in contrast to the most successful 20 th
century year of 1936 with only thirteen. (Gillespie 2012, 41)
4
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been notable threats (Gillespie 2012). Since the 1912 campaign of Teddy Roosevelt, only four
third party candidates have received more than 5 percent of the popular vote (Gold 1995, 751).5

Challenges to Running as a Third Party Candidate
I’d rather be right than President, I want my conscience clear; I’ll firmly stand for the
truth and right, I have a God to fear. I’ll work and vote the way I pray—no matter that
the scoffers say—I’d rather be right than President, I want my conscience clear
(Gillespie 2000, 45).
- Prohibitionist Party song

Numerous polls show a longstanding discontent with the two major parties. In both the
1995 and 1999 Gallup poll, over two-thirds of those interviewed were in favor of other
candidates who could run against the two major parties at the presidential, congressional, and
state level (Bibby & Maisel 2003, 57-58). These polls are not alone. Nevertheless, the two major
parties that have dominated national elections since 1860 still remain. Third parties must
overcome a litany of obstacles to be successful in elections, beginning with structural roadblocks
that favor the major parties.

Duverger’s Law
The “first past the post” plurality-based, single district election system in the United
States is a powerful influence towards a two party system (Bibby & Maisel 2003, 60-61; Neto &
Cox 1997). “An election is usually reduced to a contest between the two most popular
candidates” (Duverger 1954). Duverger’s “physiological effect” of abandoning trailing

5

Robert La Follette, 1924; George Wallace, 1968; John Anderson, 1980; Ross Perot 1992, 1996
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candidates because of a feeling that a vote for a candidate with little or no chance of winning will
be essentially “thrown away” and instead supporting one of the major parties “between whom
the election really lies” illustrates the difficulty of a minor party candidate struggling with low
support, which usually drops further as the election approaches (Duverger 1954).
For the US presidential election specifically, the electoral college and the “winner take
all” allocation of electoral votes in all but two states pushes towards a two party system even
more. Even a respectable 18% of the popular vote for Ross Perot in 1992 resulted in zero
electoral votes, as he was unable to reach a majority in any individual state (Bibby & Maisel
2003, 62).
Despite the strong power the electoral structure exerts towards a two party system, it does
not, by itself, bring about a robust two party system (Lewis-Beck & Squire 1995, 426-7).
Theodore Lowi also asks the question, “if a two-party system is so natural, why are there so
many rules and laws defending it?” (1983, 702) Although the two major parties are at odds over
many policy matters, together they create and enforce policies to maintain the duopoly status quo
(Gillespie 2012, 1).

Ballot Access
Electoral structure is not all that challenges third party candidates; ballot access is also
problematic. Parties used to be able to add candidates into a race simply for the cost of printing a
ballot. In the 1880s, the rolling introduction of the Australian ballot system in the United States
moved the burden of access to elections from the parties to the individual states (Rosenstone et
al. 1996, 22). While some states follow a more lenient example like that seen in Sweden, many
states have high barriers of entry for new parties. Collecting signatures is a requirement in most
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states with the average required number being 17,580 (Rosenstone et al. 1996, 420). Beyond the
numeric challenges of signature collection, the designated time periods which signatures can be
gathered, the rules defining who is authorized to sign, and other regulations make registration
difficult (Rosenstone et al. 1994, 20-21; Gillespie 2012, 26).6
Those who are unsuccessful in campaigning in a primary election of a major party have
additional limitations should they want to run outside of the party. Some states have passed laws
to prohibit write-in candidates, and the Supreme Court has upheld them7 (Gillespie 2012, 27).
Sore loser provisions, present in almost all states, prohibit candidates who have run in a party
primary from running in other parties or as an independent 8 (Gillespie2012, 28).
Anti-fusion laws were used effectively by third parties in the past to either gain support
for their policy goals by endorsing a major party candidate, or to band together as a number of
third parties to challenge a major party candidate (Gillespie 2012, 28-30). When upholding a
Minnesota law banning the use of fusion, William Rehnquist wrote in the majority opinion that
states have the right to “[decide] that political stability is best served through a healthy two-party
system” and “need not remove all of the many hurdles third parties face in the American political
arena today” (Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351. 1997).
This is not to say that the courts have not also struck down the most stringent ballot
requirements, and even Justice Rehnquist clarified that “unreasonably exclusionary restrictions”

Not all results of the Australian (secret) ballot are a disadvantage to third parties. The fact that it is secret
decreases the potential social cost of defecting from a major party. Speaking of three anonymous “defectors”
from the major party who voted for a Progressive candidate, a citizen of Middletown commented “if we could
discover the three people who disgraced our district by voting for La Follette, we’d certainly make it hot for them!”
(Schmidt 1960, 243; quoted in Rosenstone et al. 42)
The Australian ballot also makes split-ticket voting a simpler process. (Rosenstone et al. 25)
7 Burdick v. Tukushe, 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
8 Storer v. Brown, 414 U.S. 737 (1974). The court upheld a California law that, among signature requirements,
independent candidates must not be a member of any political party for at least one year prior to the primary
election. The same restriction was placed on running in any alternate party.
6
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were prohibited (Timmons 1997, 31-32). Wallace, McCarthy, and Anderson were all third party
candidates who challenged state ballot access laws and had ballot requirements overturned. 9

Strategic Voting
In order to prevent an undesirable election outcome, people can vote strategically instead
of sincerely. In an election between only two candidates, voters will simply choose their
preferred candidate of the two, but in an election with more than two candidates, the possibility
of strategic voting exists (Ordeshook & Zeng, 1997). Strategic, or tactical, voting is a
disadvantage for the third party candidates as voters, wary of “throwing away their vote,” will
support their preferred major party candidate instead of their true preference. Even well-known
third party candidates who poll well early often see their numbers fall as the campaigns
progresses. Voters shift support from their preferred minor party candidate to a major party
candidate who is further from their ideological ideal point but more likely to win, casting a
strategic vote instead of a sincere one (Rosenstone, Behr, & Lazarus 1996, 41; Lacy & Monson
1998, 441). This phenomenon was dubbed the “third party squeeze” by Bruce Cain (1978) and
accurately depicts the reality of many third party elections. The following is a single example of
potential strategic voting at the presidential level; while 98% and 85% of voters supporting
Reagan and Carter voted for their preferred candidate, only 41% of Anderson supporters reported
voting for him (Abramson et al. 1995, 360).
All voters have three choices in any election; vote sincerely, vote strategically, or abstain.
Strategic voting is most likely to occur when your preferred candidate has a low probability of

William v. Rhodes 393 U.S. 23 (1968) specifically called out Ohio state law as being discriminatory by giving the
two established parties “a decided advantage over new parties.” Anderson specifically challenged numerous state
laws dealing with sore loser and ballot access laws in cases such as Anderson v. Babb, Anderson v. Celebrezze, and
Anderson v. Mills
9
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winning and the utility difference between your preferred candidate and your preferred major
party candidate is small (Cain 1978, 639).
Despite some theories eliminating any possibility of anything beyond sincere voting, 10
Ordeshook and Zeng found that voters will be strategic in multi-candidate elections (1997).
Of note is the fact that the viability of a candidate in a presidential election in a single
state does not necessarily connect directly to their viability in the nation at large when it comes
to casting a sincere versus a strategic vote (Ordeshook & Zeng 1997, 15).
Speaking generally, factors like “citizen duty” 11 and closeness of an election influence
the decision to vote, while expected utility and net benefits between candidates influence for
whom to vote (Ordeshook & Zeng, 1997). A succinct summary of strategic voting follows:
That is, as the race tightens between a voter's second and third preference, as a voter's
preference for the second choice increases relative to that of the last choice, and to the
extent that one of these candidates is the likely winner, then that voter becomes
increasing likely to cast a strategic vote for the second ranked candidate. We have here,
then, clear evidence of strategic voting associated with the third party "squeeze" that is
the basis of Duverger's hypothesis about winner-take-all plurality elections (Ordeshook
& Zeng 1997, 15).
These difficulties faced by all third party campaigns help to explain the very low level of
success of almost all third party candidates in vote share. However, this is not always the case;
although rare, there are third party success stories. Many times this success is due to unique
circumstances surrounding a specific election, but there are explanations as to why a voter will
reject both major party candidates and instead vote third party.

The minimax regret model, for example, states simply that people will act to minimize the maximum (minimax)
regret. According to this theory, voters will simply choose their first preference. (Ferejohn & Fiorina 1974)
11 Added to the formula R=PB-C where P is the probability that a voter can make a difference in the outcome of the
election, B being the net benefit to the voter between candidates, and C being the cost of voting. (Ordeshook Zeng
1997) It was added to account for the reason people continue to vote even when the probability of influencing an
election is very small, especially in relation to the cost (C) of voting.
10
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Why Do Voters Choose Third Parties?
Voting for a third party candidate can be explained just as we can explain voters
supporting the major parties. George Chressanthis applies a modified rational voter model12 to
show that the motivations for minor party support at the polls mirror the motivations of major
party supporters (1990, 193). Voters are not irrational, nor do third party voters feel they are
“throwing away their vote” when supporting a third party. “Votes for third parties represent a
transmission of individual preferences by people who think their vote is important and, as a
whole, [are] seen as a signal to alter the direction of current policies by the major parties”
(Chressanthis 1990, 193).

Protest Vote
In addition to voting sincerely for preferred policy positions, a third party vote can also
be cast as a form of protest against both major parties when either the positions of the parties or
the candidates themselves are unattractive (Gillespie 2012, 3). 1968 presidential candidate
George Wallace was quoted as claiming that there was “not a dime’s bit of difference between
the two major parties,” tapping into the public sentiment that both major parties were not being
receptive to voters’ preferences (Gold 1995). As the positions of both parties increase in distance
from a voter’s preference, and as the salience of that policy goes up, the likelihood of defecting
to a third party increases (Rosenstone et al. 1996, 127-30).

The model is from the Barzel and Siliberberg 1973 article “Is the Act of Voting Rational?” Modifications were
made due to the use of presidential elections. The initial model did not use presidential elections because of
concerns that the electoral college might bias results. Because third party campaigns for president are much more
prevalent than for state-level positions, presidential election data was used in this case.
12
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Low Trust in Government
Many successful third party candidates capitalize on a lower level of trust in both the
government and the major political parties. Analysis of the Miller Index of Trust in Government
(TIG) leads Peterson and Wrighton to conclude that “in all of our analyses, we have found
consistent support for the use of the trust index as a predictor of third-party voting. The results
have clearly demonstrated the long-term durability of the index, and we have shown that the
index is not merely a predictor of trust in the incumbent government” (Peterson & Wrighton
1998, 17). Multiple tests confirm that hypothesis.
Wallace and Perot both drew votes from the distrustful (Heatherington 1999, 312) while
Anderson and Perot ran during times where measured trust in the government was low
(Heatherington 1999, 313). Voters in this situation are “pushed” to a third party due to major
party failure (Allen & Brox 2005, 630) or “pulled” to a third party through identification with,
and loyalty to, the party or positive evaluations of a specific third party candidate (Allen & Brox
2005).

Candidate Traits
Beyond capitalizing on popular discontent with the major parties, third party candidates
with appeal to voters can motivate people to vote for someone with little to no chance of winning
(Heatherington 1999). There have been volumes of literature stating that candidate personality
and campaigns play a very minor part in voter selection. Numerous studies found that vote
choice made in the spring before any serious campaigning (and even before some primaries)
changed very little when it came to election day in November (Lazarsfield Berelson & Gaudet,
1944). Party identification has been shown in numerous studies to be the single most important
variable when predicting vote choice (Campbell, Converse, Miller, Stokes. 1960). This research
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is difficult to counter and is still correct when applied to the two major parties.13 However, the
effect of a candidate’s personality and their campaign does impact candidate success to a higher
degree when applied to third parties. Popkin (1994) explains that party affiliation is a longstanding identity indicator that simplifies the voting process for the average voter. Independent
candidates have no structured positions connected to a well-known party, and third party
positions are not as well understood by the public who use party affiliation for a voting cue.
Third parties lack the existing predispositions that exist connecting the candidate to a list of
political positions common to a major party candidate. This opens the door to candidate
personalities and campaigns becoming greater influencers over voter preference (Luks Miller &
Jacobs 2003, 12). Over half of a third party candidate’s votes will come from independents
(Flanigan & Zingale 2002, 83), so in order to know a third party candidate’s positions, voters
must follow the campaign to find this information. By examining trait ratings of both major and
minor party candidates, Luks, Miller, and Jacobs (2003) show that partisan identification is a
small and often statistically insignificant impact when it comes to rating third party candidates.
Third party candidates can be grouped into three levels of recognition; non-prestigious,
prestigious, and nationally prestigious (Rosenstone et al. 1996, 140-1). Prestigious candidates are
defined as being well known in specific geographic areas, such as senators, representatives, or
governors, none of whom have run in a national campaign. Nationally prestigious candidates
would have run for national level offices before, and include current or former presidents and
vice-presidents (Rosenstone et al. 1996, 140).

Glenn Tinder’s phrase “the politics of convenience” is particularly appropriate here, describing the major
political parties as a low cost way to express preferences (1986, 172-73).
13
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Candidates already well known in the voting area can more easily overcome the
anonymity that third party candidates usually face (Lacy & Monson 2002, 411). The success of
George Wallace in the South can be partially attributed to his prestige or reputation in that
specific geographic area. A rising level of prestige equals a commensurate rise in vote share
(Lacy & Monson 2002, 411). As illustrated by Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus in Third Parties in
America, non-prestigious presidential candidates are overwhelmingly (87.7%) likely to net less
than 1% of the popular vote share, while prestigious candidates are most likely to carry from 13% of the vote share. Nationally prestigious candidates are also most likely to net over 9% of
total popular votes, something that has never happened with a non-prestigious candidate (Lacy &
Monson 2002, 141).

Economic Hardship
Voters feel disillusionment from the established parties for many reasons. Long-term
economic stagnation or recession is a cause for rising support for alternate parties. A short-term
economic downturn during the leadership of a single party will pull median voters towards the
other major party. However, after a period of time where both major parties have tried and failed
to produce economic results, support for third parties will rise in the form of protest votes or as
an expression of distrust and dissatisfaction with the status quo. The voter strategy to abandon
the major parties in times of dissatisfaction is not unique to the United States. Studies from
Spain (Roberts 2017, 31), Belgium, the Netherlands (Hooghe & Dassonneville, 2018;
Schumacher and Rooduijn, 2013; cited in Hernandez 2018, 460), and others show this idea to be
common in democracies. Voters connect problems to the mainstream parties because the
perception is that they are part of the system as well as part of the problem (Gillespie 2012).

14

Populism and Major Party Failure
When a critical mass of the population no longer believes the establishment is working
towards their best interests, alternate methods of representation can appear. Especially in
systems where political parties are so intertwined with the political process, alternate parties are
a common method of populist14 expression. Despite populist movements “offering more direct
forms of democratic empowerment,” (Roberts 2017, 2) we still must understand populist
movements within the scope of political parties. A third party is the “electoral vehicle” by which
alternate candidates attempt to sway voters (Roberts 2017, 2).
Major parties are perceived to be out of touch when they are seen not as an intermediate
institution representing the people in the government, but as “semi-state agencies” protecting the
status quo (Roberts 2017, 8). This “Organizational Cartelization” paints the parties as
unchanging structures more interested in their own interests than those of the voters and as
holding positions that may no longer accurately represent the positions of the public generally
(Roberts 2017, 8).
“When the mainstream political forces become too similar, they provide fertile ground
for the rise of populism” (Torre & Kaltwasser 2015, 189; quoted in Roberts 2017). When both
major political parties begin to converge on platforms of salient political positions, more and
more voters feel alienated and without adequate representation. Once again, due to parties being
so integrated in the US political system, alternate parties are more likely to either form or
increase in popularity as more voters seek out representation.
It is outside the scope of this paper to attempt to exactly define, or argue the semantics of, populism, something
many have stated is difficult to pin down exactly 14. It is sufficient to say here that it is “anti-establishment appeal
to mass constituencies” or “the quintessential expression of anti-elite and anti-establishment politics.” (Roberts
2017, 4)
14
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Both “Organizational Cartelization” and “Programmatic Convergence” (Roberts 2017, 812) are explanations for major party failure that lead to increased support for third parties under
the broader theory of populism.
In summary, unacceptable primary party candidates, combined with the availability of
viable and attractive third party candidates, can pull voters with both low trust and negative
attitudes towards government, as well as weaker party ties, to support a third party campaign.

Traditional Third Party Success
Candidates in third parties approach elections strategically, just as major party candidates
do (Rosenstone Behr & Lazarus 1996, 190). Downs explicitly states that political parties or
candidates work towards the goal of “the income, prestige, and power which come from being in
office” (Downs 1957, 28). Third parties are no different. As conditions supporting a third party
begin to align, the chance of third party runs will increase. Even so, the chance of a third party
presidential win is almost zero. If candidates run without much hope to win, what is it that
motivates a campaign? Some run to advance a cause. By bringing an issue to the forefront, a
show of public support can force a major party to take up that cause in the future to draw those
voters to the party (Rosenstone et al. 188-189). As both major parties are seen as out of touch
with a critical mass of voters, third parties can be the “vehicles for presenting, channeling, and
pursuing views of the disaffected” (Gillespie 2012, 49).15 Some candidates run to establish
themselves as a political figure and gain recognition (Gillespie 2012). Instead of running to win a

Third parties are also referred to as “safety valves for discontent” by Rosenstone et. al (1996. 9) referring to their
ability to channel opposition to the major parties into visible public support for those alternate positions. Thus
third party success is also seen as “major party failure” (Rosenstone et al 1996. 126-7).
15
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campaign, some may run in opposition to a political foe (Gillespie 2012) such as the incumbent
president (Rosenstone Behr & Lazarus 1996, 198) or a political party they feel has deteriorated.
This deterioration must be significant in order to counter the high cost of defecting from a major
party and the low probability of success of third party campaigns (Rosenstone Behr & Lazarus
1996, 198).
Third party campaigns will often emerge due to major party failure (Rapaport & Stone
2009). A disaffected constituency voting third party sends a message to the major parties who
must then appeal to this group to gain, or re-gain, their support. The larger the group, the greater
the motivation of each major party to draw votes from this disaffected group during an election
(Rapaport & Stone 2009).
This major party failure could be seen as either a candidate selection (short-term) failure,
or a party position (long-term) failure. When both parties present unattractive candidates, a
larger group of voters will be disaffected to the point of turning to alternative candidates from
third parties. This problem of candidates for the major parties should be considered a short-term
party failure. A possible situation that would bring about this major party failure would be
extreme and highly active minorities from both parties exerting a disproportional influence on
primaries or caucuses, which leads to a candidate who is unappealing to median voters. Longterm, or policy-focused, major party failure deals with the issues the parties choose to emphasize,
or the positions taken on those issues. This failure goes beyond simply fielding an unattractive
candidate who will be gone the next election cycle, and hits more to the core of the party
identity. The lasting effect of long-term party failure is that these positions linger beyond a
single candidate and continue to plague major parties until they rebrand themselves in a more
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palpable way to the median voters. 16 A shift to the far right or left from either major party would
cause discontent with median voters in a similar way that the single extreme candidate would.
Examining third party supporters of significant third party candidates for president
reveals trends and paints a picture of the traditional third party voter. Ross Perot took advantage
of anti-partisan sentiment as well as general frustration with the government and politics. Exit
polls describe the majority of his supporters as those in more difficult economic situations,
younger voters, and those not affiliated with either party (Gold 1995). Ralph Nader supporters
were further to the left on ideology, and he also appealed to those with low levels of satisfaction
in the government (Allen & Brox 2005). George Wallace similarly capitalized on perceptions of
the national government being out of touch with citizens. He also had support from those with
low partisan attachment and younger voters (Gold 1995). Almost half of John Anderson voters
were casting a vote against other candidates, as opposed to a vote for Anderson (Gold 1995).

Unique Definition of Third Party Success
“A third party vote does not merely signify the selection of one of three equally attractive
options; it is an extraordinary act that requires the voter to reject explicitly the major parties.” 17

It is accepted that numerical support for third parties at the polls is low on almost all
levels of elections and in almost all regions of the country. This leads many papers and

As far as the scope of this paper, my focus in on the 2016 presidential election and the influence of short term
major party candidate selection failure by both the Republican and Democrat parties. Because candidate selection
is varied in each election cycle, results in the coming presidential election may not be influenced in the same way.
17 (Rosenstone et al. 1994, 15)
16
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discussions to be limited to the two major parties as a sufficient overview of elections 18 (Lee
2012, 146). However, these campaigns can impact elections beyond what would be assumed
based on vote share alone.
If a third party campaign attracts a large base of support during an election, both major
parties will attempt to address their concerns by shifting their platforms or the salience of
specific issues to attract those voters (Lee 2012, 139). This could be another type of success for a
third party as the policy grievances that led to third party support initially are now being
addressed by one or both major parties. Abstaining from elections, or strategically voting for
your most preferred major party candidate instead of a third party, sends a weak message and
may lead to major parties continuing on with “business as usual” (Peterson & Wrighton 1998,
30).
An example of primary party shift is the Populist Party movement in the late 1800s and
early 1900s that was adopted by the Democrat Party through New Deal legislation 19 (Lowi
1983, 703; Lee 2012, 139). Labor unions and other donors who had traditionally supported the
Populist Party increasingly began sending campaign donations to the Democrat party (Hirano &
Snyder, 8). Similarly, well-known populist candidates began campaigning under the Democrat
flag20 (Hirano & Snyder, 9). A more contemporary example of this adopting of third party
policies is the campaign of Ross Perot in his 1992 and 1996 presidential campaigns. Seeing his
Even the most famous case of third party election impact at the presidential level, when Ralph Nader supposedly
cost Democratic candidate Al Gore the presidency in 2000, might not be as clear of an impact as Nader pulled
voters away from Gore, giving the majority to Republican George W. Bush. (Lee 2011, 138; Herron & Lewis 2007;
Lacy & Burden 1995).
19 Hirano and Snyder provide ample evidence of this “co-opting” phenomenon, including a list of prominent new
deal legislation supported by the far left and a reduction of campaign contributions to the Democrats by banks and
businesses.
20 Success is also not defined the same in different parties. Policy-seeking parties would most likely view major
party co-option of their platform as success, while candidate-seeking parties would not.
18
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success,21 Republican leadership, through their “Contract with America,” made a concerted
effort to contact Perot supporters (Rapaport & Stone 2007, 237). This effort highlighted
similarities between the Republican and Perot platforms, while remaining silent on the
differences. On the other side of the political spectrum, Democrats used this same strategy by
emphasizing issues such as income inequality due to the campaign success of Ralph Nader in the
1990s.
Even the threat of third parties, or a sufficiently large base of support for a minor party,
can lead to shifting positions within the major parties irrespective of major party failure, close
elections, or other abnormal circumstances (Lee 2011, 138).

Utah 2016 Presidential Election
Moving beyond this background of major party failure theory into the Utah 2016
election, how were the two major party candidates seen by the voters? Commenting on the major
party choices in 2016, Daniel Thatcher, a Republican serving in the Utah State Senate, said
“they’re both awful” and, “they’re both quite possibly the two worst people in the universe”
(Merica & Simon, 2016). He also called the odds for each candidate in the state “50/50.” While
this commentary is extreme, it illustrates the frustration that many Utah voters felt with both
major party candidates. Utah, the long-time Republican stronghold, put Trump third in the
caucus vote, and his crass commentary and behavior caused many Utahans to rescind
endorsements and withdraw support. Opinions of Clinton were no better, with 80% of the state

The only third party candidate to receive at least 5% of the popular vote in two successive elections since the
forming of the Republican party in the 1850s, as well as the most popular third party candidate since Teddy
Roosevelt in 1912 (Rapaport Stone 2007, 235).
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(including many Democrats) calling Clinton untrustworthy at the time of the election (“Utah
College Exit Poll” 2016).
It was in this environment that candidate Evan McMullin became one of the most
successful third party candidates, by vote share, in the history of the state of Utah. He is an
outlier from both the common theories of third party success, as well as previous examples of
successful third party candidates for president. McMullin had no large sums of money to
campaign with as Ross Perot. He had no prestige or name recognition22 in Utah at all, having
only lived in the state for a short time. He had no experience in political campaigns, and he had
never held, or even run for, elected office before. Regarding candidate traits, he dis not stand out
among other third party candidates in a way to explain his unusual success. Perhaps he appealed
to the voters who were dissatisfied with both major parties, but Utah has had candidates from the
Libertarian and Constitutional Parties for decades who could have appealed to the same voters,
yet never did to this degree.
A short-term candidate selection failure in both major parties created a necessary, but not
sufficient, condition for a third party campaign. It is also clear that Evan McMullin did not
follow the traditional paths of success used by other third parties. It is this specific electoral
condition that makes Utah a valuable and unique case study to examine additional routes of
success for third party candidates and campaigns. The peculiar population of the state of Utah in
regards to religious affiliation could be a casual mechanism that led to higher than normal
defection rates from a major party and the unusual success of Evan McMullin. 23

The book title “Actor’s Athletes, and Astronauts” is especially appropriate highlighting the advantage name
recognition brings to amateurs running for political office, especially against seasoned and incumbent opponents,
something Evan McMullin had none of.
23 Religion could be a mechanism despite Evan McMullin downplaying religion as a motivator for his presidential
run. “It’s about principles. They’re not only Mormon principles, they are the principles of millions of Americans, I
am the only true conservative in this race” (McCombs, Brady 2016)
22

21

Religion is Still Significant in US Elections
Despite the great amount of attention given to divisions like race, gender, or socioeconomic status, religion as a variable in voting behavior is still worthy of study. The United
States retains a higher religious identification than many other developed countries based on
numerous comparative analyses (Manza & Brooks 1997), and has remained so throughout
upheaval periods such as the New Deal era, which emphasized class differences as a new
cleavage that might re-define party support. Even with a growing secularization in the US and
an overall diminishing level of religious influence, this does not mean that religious cleavages no
longer exist or are no longer influencing behavior (Manza & Brooks 1997, 71-73). Especially
with the religious right emerging as a non-trivial voting bloc, it seems that religion remains an
important part of voter identification.
This is not to say that religious affiliation is the only variable when predicting vote
choice, or even the most significant. Many religious groups suffer from their own cleavages
between the hard-core purists and the pragmatists, who are more willing to accept compromise
(Manza & Brooks 1997, 12). Candidates supported by the purists will have little chance of
winning wide-spread support outside of the narrow base, and pragmatic candidates may not be
supported initially by purists (Manza & Brooks 1997, 12). For this and other reasons, hypotheses
about religious impact on voting involve a list of complex social relationships and are far from a
dichotomous division between “religious” and “non-religious.” While religion exerts a relatively
minor level of influence when compared to factors such as party identification, occasional
elections and candidates will show a much larger impact due to religious affiliation. Prominent
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examples of this are the 1960 election of John F. Kennedy24 and the campaigns of Jimmy Carter
in 1976 and 1980.25

Impact of the Latter-Day Saint Vote Specifically
Study of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints’ influence on voting behavior is
interesting because political activities of its members are influenced by their religious beliefs
(Cann 2009, 111; Campbell & Monson 2003). Although the church did take official positions on
specific candidates and political positions earlier in its history,26 church policy no longer allows
for endorsing parties, candidates, or platforms, the use of church buildings or resources for
partisan purposes, direction of vote choice, or dictating the actions of a government leader
(Political Neutrality, Global Newsroom). However, the church will occasionally make
statements regarding moral issues.
It is clear that external forces can influence a religious bloc in a way that decreases their
unity at the ballot box. Adapting a theory of public opinion by John Zaller (1992), Campbell and
Monson use the pattern of receiving information, deciding whether or not to accept it, and then
making a decision based on information received (Zaller 1992, 42-51). The crucial adaptation
made by Campbell and Monson in the Zaller theory is a substitution of the knowledge variable
with a measure of devoutness, which they argue will influence both how an individual member
will receive statements from church leadership, as well as the likelihood that they will act in line
with it.

Catholic voters were 3.3 times more likely to vote for Kennedy, all else being equal. (Manza Brooks 1997. 53)
Conservative Protestants were more likely to support Jimmy Carter.
26 In the early history of the church, leaders asked members to vote together to increase their political influence.
This took place both in Illinois, as well as when the membership at large moved to the Salt Lake valley (Cann 112).
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When studying Latter-Day Saints as a political unit, you need not examine their internal
unity only, but also the criticism against them from the population at large. Campbell, Breen,
and Monson propose that both high “internal solidarity” as well as high “external tensions” have
created a Mormon voting bloc that is more cohesive than almost any other religious
organization27 (2014, 46-53). Beyond just a religious identity, Latter-Day Saints are more
politically united than almost any other demographic of race, ethnicity, or socio-economic status
(Fox 2006). The membership was even united during periods of political vacillation, where Utah
voters would swing wildly between supporting Republicans and Democrats 28 (Brown 2018, 34).
The unique moral identity of Latter-Day Saints, that is both separate from secular Americans as
well as members of most other religions, makes members of the Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints an interesting case study in political behavior.
It is an oversimplification to connect the Utah vote with the church vote directly.
However, 55% of the Utah’s population are members of the church, by far the highest percentage
of church members of any state in the country. For the past 50 years, the percentage of
Republican voting in this cohesive Utah Latter-Day Saint population has increased steadily over
time. In the 1970s, Utah was voting Republican at a 10% higher rate than the country-wide
average, and by 2012 it had risen to over 40% (Campbell et al. 2014, 83).
Utah seems to be a unique situation for both members and non-members of the church. It
is already clear that Utah is a Republican stronghold, and has been for decades. Factoring in the
variables of being a citizen of the state of Utah, as well as being a Latter-Day Saint, increases the
chance of identifying as Republican from 39% to 78% (Brown 2018). However, for a person
living in Utah who is not a member of the church, their chance of identifying as Republican
Data gathered from the 2007 Pew Religious Landscape Survey.
During the early period after archiving statehood, both the House and Senate in Utah had periods of Republican
and Democrat control. Since the 1970s, however, both houses have been solidly Republican. (Brown 37)
27
28
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decreases by 34% (Brown 2018). This is not the drastic correlation between members of the
church and Republicans, but further shows that membership of Utah’s largest church is a
significant political cleavage. Even before Utah gained statehood in 1896, the People’s Party
and the Liberal Party offered a clear political line that mirrored the division between members
and non-members of the church (Brown 2018). It seems that the Republican/Democrat division
is a de facto mechanism to divide members and non-members.

Although Mitt Romney predictably did very well in Utah (72.62% overall, and 78% from
Mormon voters), he is hardly an outlier. In 2008, John McCain received 75% support from Utah
Latter-Day Saints, and 79% of members supported midterm Republican candidates in 2010.
However, simply examining the support of political parties does not convey the more complex
relationship that Latter-Day Saint voters have with other GOP-supporting religious groups.
Members of the church depart from the party line on immigration, and they have more moderate
views on gay marriage (allowing for civil unions) and abortion (some allowance for rape, or in
cases where the health of the mother is at risk) (Campbell et al. 2003, 127). These are differences
specifically compared to evangelicals, a group often compared to Latter-Day Saints in voting
behavior. It is the nuanced differences between these religions that make the Latter-Day Saint
vote unique, and it is these same differences that could cause defection from the Republican
Party in situations where Evangelicals and other religious groups would remain loyal. Even on
the campaign trail, Donald Trump recognized the struggle he was having in appealing to the
Republican stronghold that is Utah Mormons. 29 Adam Brown observed that “Trump lagged in
Utah because he activated precisely those cleavages that make Utah’s Mormon Republican most
different from Republicans elsewhere” (2018, 159).
Trump mentions having a “tremendous problem” in Utah (Tom Hamburger and Sean Sullivan Washington
Post August 11, 2016 “Trump makes play for evangelicals...”).
29
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Hypothesis
Use of the Utah 2016 presidential election allows testing of theories developed earlier.
Because Evan McMullin does not share the same advantages many successful third party
candidates have had in the past, religious identity is proposed as a causal mechanism for Evan
McMullin support. Despite the declining impact of denominational cleavages between voters
(Brooks & Manza 1997), these divisions still exist in a statistically significant way with the
Latter-Day Saints due to their generally high levels of participation or activity.

Hypothesis 1: Latter-Day Saints will be more likely to vote for Evan McMullin than
would any other religious group, all else being equal.

In addition, Utahans are more active in their religion on average, 30 and one theory is that
many religious people (irrespective of affiliation) were bothered by Donald Trump’s morals and
behavior, which led to decreased support. Republican political leaders31 in the state rescinded
support for Trump after a tape recording was leaked where Trump bragging about “groping and
kissing women without their consent” (Gildea, Terry 2016). Based on the adaptation of the
Zaller theory substituting cognitive knowledge with devoutness (Campbell & Monson 2003), the
more active a member is, 32 the more likely they are to vote together. 33

Based on a self-described survey in the 2016 exit poll.
Including Governor Gary Herbert, Jon Huntsman Jr., Mitt Romney, and Senator Mike Lee.
32
“Religious commitment has been shown to be an important mediator between denominational affiliation and its
effect on political behavior” (e.g., Leege & Kellstedt 1993; Kohut et al. 2000).
33 This hypothesis referrers to membership in general, as Latter-Day Saint political elites are not likely to vote as a
bloc in the same way (Cann 2009).
30
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Hypothesis 2: Irrespective of religious affiliation, a higher level of religiosity (measured
as self-described level of activity) will correspond with a higher level of support for Evan
McMullin.

Finally, in order to quantify major party failure and set the stage for third party success, trust
levels in each candidate can be measured based on feedback in the exit poll.

Hypothesis 3: Support for Evan McMullin will be highest from those who distrust both
major party candidates.

Data and Results
To verify these hypotheses, I turn to the 2016 BYU college exit poll for the state of
Utah. This exit poll has been the longest-running exit poll in the state and was started in 1982 by
David Magleby, a political science professor at Brigham Young University (Jenkins 2012). The
data is generally very accurate, and since its inception over 30 years ago, this poll has never
incorrectly called an election (Donaldson 2018).
The poll data will be compared to actual election results, as well as general demographic
data of the state of Utah to verify that the sample of voters represents the state at large and is not
influenced by exogenous variables. Figure 1 compares the exit poll predictions to the actual vote
counts, while Figure 2 compares data from the exit poll to the demographic data from the US
Census Bureau. The exit poll predicted slightly lower support for Trump with a commensurate
higher predicted support for Clinton, while observing support for Evan McMullin almost exactly.
The number of men and women represented in the exit poll mimics the actual population within
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one percent. The exit poll also drew a slightly larger percent of college educated people vis a vis
high school level, although the differences are slight. Other observations are represented in
figures 1 and 2 below.
It is clear that the exit poll represents an accurate cross-section of Utah and is valid data
to draw results from.

Figure 1
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Figure 2

There were several notable third party candidates during this time, which accounts for the
spikes in third party support. Ralph Nader in ‘98, Ross Perot in ‘92/’96, John Anderson in ‘80,
and George Wallace in ‘68 were all well-known third party candidates throughout the country,
and higher numbers of third party votes in these elections would be expected. These elections
are shown in Figure 3, which shows Utah presidential election results from 1960 to the most
recent 2016 election.
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Figure 3

It is also important to mention Mitt Romney, the Republican candidate in 2012 who received the
second highest percentage of the popular vote in the timespan shown. It would be suspected that
if Evan McMullin’s membership in the LDS church would impact voting, then the same might
be said for Mitt Romney, although I am not examining that election specifically.
The 2016 election was ripe for a viable third party candidate in Utah, with both major
parties fielding unattractive candidates. For the Latter-Day Saint community specifically, both
Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump carried heavy baggage regarding their moral or policy
positions.
Hypothesis 3 states support for Evan McMullin will be highest from those with low trust
in both candidates. Based on the cross-tab found in table 1, 36% of Evan McMullin voters
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distrusted both major party candidates, a higher than voters for Clinton, Trump, or other third
party candidates.

Table 1. Cross Tabulation of Trust and Vote Choice
Trust One or Both Distrust Both
Total
Donald Trump 10,857
1,259
12,216
Hillary Clinton
Evan McMullin
Other
Total

41.47%
8,933
33.81%
4,822
18.25%
1,712
6.48%
26,424
100%

30.63%
858
20.88%
1,483
36.08%
501
12.41%
4,110
100%

40.01%
9,791
32.07%
6,305
7.28%
2,222
7.28%
30,534
100%

Pearson X2 1000
p<.05

Examining the influence of religiosity and vote choice in Table 2, we see that while
Donald Trump did well with active voters, which is expected from the Republican candidate,
Evan McMullin did even better, with 80% of his supporters identifying as “Very Active,”
compared to Trump’s 60%. As expected, Hillary Clinton was lower at 24%.

31

Table 2. Religiosity and Presidential Vote Choice
Activity Very
Somewhat Not Very Not
Does Not/ Total
N/A
Donald 6,774
1,825
859
986
951
11,395
Trump
59.45%
16.02%
7.54%
8.65%
8.35%
100%
Hillary 2,298
1,357
932
1,503
3,196
9,286
Clinton
24.75%
14.61%
10.04%
16.19%
34.42%
100%
Evan 4,866
584
184
181
226
6,041
McMullin
80.55%
9.67%
3.05%
3.00%
3.74%
100%
Other 838
317
180
251
519
2,105
39.81%
15.06%
8.55%
11.92%
24.66%
100%
Total 14,776
4,083
2,155
5,921
4,892
28,827
51.26%
14.16%
7.48%
10.13%
16.97%
100%
Pearson 64000
X2
p<.05
Following is a cross-tab of votes for president in 2016 and self-identified party
affiliation. Table 2 divides results between those identifying as “LDS” and “Not LDS” and
describes their respective support for presidential candidates.
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Table 3. Cross Tabulation of Religious Affiliation and Presidential Vote Choice

Candidate Not LDS
Donald Trump 4,160
30.29%
Hillary Clinton 7,419
54.01%
Evan McMullin 871
6.34%
Other 1,286
9.36%
Total 13,763
100%

LDS
8,056
47.96%
2,372
14.12%
5,434
32.35%
936
5.57%
16,798
100%

Total
12,216
40.01%
9,791
32.07
6,305
20.65%
2,222
7.28%
30,534
100%

Pearson X2 7,000
p<.05

Not surprisingly, the “Not LDS” population highly favored Hillary Clinton, while the
inverse was true for the “LDS” population. It is interesting to note that Evan McMullin comes in
second place, in front of Clinton, among Latter-Day Saint voters overall.
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Table 4. Cross Tabulation of Age and Presidential Vote Choice
Presidential
Vote
18-39
Donald 4,348
Trump
31.8%
Hillary 4,554
Clinton
33.31%
Evan 3,374
McMullin
24,68%
Other 1,395
10.2%
Total 13,671
13,671
100.00%

Recode of Age
40-64
4,847

65+
2,061

Total
11,256

45.72%
3,276

49.02%
1,359

39.53%
9,189

30.90%
1,933

32.33%
638

32.27%
5,945

18.23%
545
5.14%
10,601
10,601
100.00%

15.18%
146
3.47%
4,204
4,204
100.00%

20.88%
2,086
7.33%
28,476
28,476
100.00%

Pearson X2 920.3607
p<.05

Accounting only for age in comparison to presidential vote, Republican voting patterns
were normal in that increasing age correlated to a higher percentage of Republican support.
Support for Hillary Clinton remained constant across the age spectrum. Evan McMullin had
slightly higher support in the 18-39 age range, but not significantly, and it would be difficult to
attribute age as the only cause. Younger voters also tended to have less partisan attachment,
which could have played a part in the results.
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Table 5. Cross Tabulation of Self-Identified Party Affiliation and Presidential Vote
Choice
Presidential
Vote

Three-Category Party ID (Self-Identified)

Democrat
Donald 258
Trump
3.17%
Hillary 7082
Clinton
87.07%
Evan 380
McMullin
4.67%
Other 414
5.09%
Total 8,134
100%

Independent
1896

Republican
9286

Total
11440

32.37%
1561

62.21%
688

39.56%
9331

26.65%
1,363

4.61%
4,295

32.27%
6,038

23.27%
1,038
17.72%
5,858
100%

28.78%
657
4.40%
14,926
100%

20.88%
2,109
7.29%
28,918
100%

Pearson X2 18000
p<.05

Examining self-identified political affiliation with presidential vote choice shows a
typical distribution of Democrat voters; a very high level of support for Clinton and almost none
for Trump. Trump did not see Republican Party members turning out for him in the same way
that Democrats did for Clinton. While Independent candidates, also as expected, see their
highest level of support from self-identified Independents, Evan McMullin did not share that
median voter support. The Republican voters who did not show up for Trump did vote, and they
voted for McMullin. Republican and Democrat support for other Independent candidates was
nearly as low as support for the candidate of one party from members of the other, but Evan
McMullin drew a large number of Republican voters away from Trump. This explains the lower
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level of support for Trump by Republicans compared to the strong Democrat support for Clinton.
With only three divisions of party affiliation, trends are more difficult to see. Returning to the
original seven divisions of self-described party affiliation and re-running the cross-tab shows a
more detailed breakdown and a clearer image of support for Evan McMullin throughout the
political spectrum.

Table 6. Cross Tabulation of Self-Identified Political Affiliation and Presidential
Vote Choice34
Presidential
Vote

Political Identification
1

Donald 71
Trump
2.19%
Hillary 3,072
Clinton
94.76%
Evan 40
McMullin
1.23%
Other 59
1.82%
Total 3,242
100%

2

3

4

5

6

7

Total

64

123

950

2692

1534

5060

10494

5.19%
1,037

3.36%
2,973

28.49% 50.21% 51.93%
991
355
220

76.55%
113

39.76%
8,761

84.04% 81.27% 29.72% 6.62%
73
267
829
1,956

7.45%
1,056

1.71%
1,283

33.19%
5,504

5.92%
60
4.86%
1,234
100%

35.75%
144
4.87%
2,954
100%

19.41%
154
2.33%
6,610
100%

20.85%
1,635
6.19%
26,394
100%

7.3%
295
8.06%
3,658
100%

24.87%
564
16.92%
3,334
100%

36.48%
359
6.7%
5,362
100%

Pearson X2 19000

McMullin, surprisingly, is strongest with Independents leaning Republican and Not So
Strong Republicans, with 36 and 35 percent respectively. Support then drops to 19% with
Strong Republicans. Clearly, while diehard Republican Party members, as a whole, remained

1=”Strong Democrat” 2=”Not so strong Democrat” 3=”Independent leaning Democrat” 4=”Independent”
5=”Independent leaning Republican” 6=Not so strong Republican” 7=”Strong Republican”
34
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loyal to the party candidate, the weaker and leaning members were more likely to defect to
McMullin.

Table 7. Cross Tabulation of Self-Identified Party Affiliation and Presidential Vote
Choice (LDS only)
Presidential Three-Category Party ID (Self-Identified)
Vote
Democrat
Independent
Republican
Donald 120
1010
6888
Trump
6.22%
34.23%
58.19%
Hillary 1477
442
443
Clinton
76.57%
14.98%
3.74%
Evan 250
1109
4048
McMullin
12.96%
37.58%
34.2%
Other 82
390
458
4.25%
13.22%
3.87%
Total 1929
2951
11837
100%
100%
100%
Pearson X2 7900
p<.05

Total
8018
47.96%
2362
14.13%
5407
32.34%
930
5.56%
16717
100%
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Table 8. Cross Tabulation of Self-Identified Party Affiliation and Presidential Vote
Choice (non-LDS only)
Presidential Three-Category Party ID (Self-Identified)
Vote
Democrat
Independent
Republican
Donald 138
886
2398
Trump
2.22%
30.48%
77.63%
Hillary 5,605
1119
245
Clinton
90.33%
38.49%
7.93%
Evan 130
254
247
McMullin
2.1%
8.74%
8%
Other 332
648
199
5.35%
22.29%
6.44%
Total 6,205
2,907
3,089
100%
100%
100%

Total
3422
28.05%
6969
57.12%
631
5.17%
1,179
9.66%
12,201
100%

Pearson X2 7700
p<.05

Tables 7 and 8 compare self-identified party affiliation with presidential vote choice for
both members and non-members of the church. As predicted in Hypothesis 1, support for
McMullin among Latter-Day Saints is higher across the political spectrum compared to nonmembers. Also, members’ support for Trump among Republicans was 20% lower than nonmember Republicans.
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Table 9. Cross Tabulation of Self-Identified Religious Activity and Presidential
Vote Choice for LDS members.
Presidential
Vote

Self-Proclaimed Level of Activity in Religion
Very

Donald 6,001
Trump
46.92%
Hillary 1,435
Clinton
11.22%
Evan 4,714
McMullin
36.86%
Other 640
5.00%
Total 12,790
100%
Pearson X2 816.256
p<.05

Somewhat Not Very Not
Active
1,152
452
375

Does Not Total
55

8,035

50.93%
436

49.94%
251

52.96%
219

51.4%
25

47.94%
2,366

19.27%
513

27.73%
126

31.51%
56

23.36%
17

14.12%
5,426

22.68%
161
7.12%
2,262
100%

13.92%
76
8.4%
905
100%

8.06%
45
6.47%
695
100%

15.89%
10
9.35%
107
100%

32.38%
932
5.56%
16, 759
100%
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Table 10. Cross Tabulation of Religious Activity and Party ID of LDS McMullin
Voters
Three Category Party ID
Activity Index Democrat
Independent
Republican
Very Active 184
883
3628
73.9%
79.69%
89.76%
Somewhat 47
162
302
Active
18.88%
14.62%
7.47%
Not Very 10
43
70
Active
4.02%
3.88%
1.73%
Not Active 8
13
32
3.21%
1.17%
.79%
N/A No Reply 0
7
10
0.00%
.63%
.25%
Total 249
1,108
4,042
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%

Total
4695
86.96%
511
9.46%
123
2.28%
53
.98%
17
.31%
5,399
100.00%

Pearson X2 126
P<.05

Building from Hypothesis 1 and an analysis of Tables 9 and 10, the data for Latter-Day
Saints is further scrutinized by stratifying activity levels among members of the church only.
Hypothesis 2b, as an adaptation of the Zaller theory, predicts a higher level of support for
McMullin as activity in the church rises. As expected, there was an increased level of support
for McMullin as church activity levels increased, while support for Trump remained consistent
across the activity spectrum. Table 8 analyzes only McMullin voters who are also Latter-Day
Saints, and clearly the strongest voter turnout for McMullin was among Republican voters who
are also Very Active members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints.
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As a final analysis of the 2016 presidential election in Utah, I combined the individual
variables into a single multinomial logit model. This allows factoring of multiple variables to
account for common influences on voting behavior, such as age (in years), gender, education
level, and race, while simultaneously examining potential independent variables that are
statistically significant. This is especially useful when multiple variables apply to every data
point, such as this example, where individual voters filled out an exit poll. In this model, the
baseline is a vote for Donald Trump, and the three columns are votes for Hillary Clinton, Evan
McMullin, and the catch-all category ‘Other’ for all remaining candidates. The results of this
analysis appear below in Table 11.
The variables Active LDS and Not Active LDS represent voters who self-identified as
either active or not active in the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. Partisan
identification labels from Strong Democrat to Strong Republican, such as the religious affiliation
and activity measurements, are also self-identified. The Age variable divides voters by one year
age increments. As expected, the coefficient is small, but becomes more significant as wider age
ranges are measured. Male, College, and White are categorical variables identifying the gender,
education level, and race of voters. The Distrust variable was created by coding voters’
responses to the question of whether each candidate was considered “Honest and Trustworthy”
by the voter. Voters were coded as having distrust if they marked both major party candidates as
not being honest and trustworthy on the exit poll. Most partisans would consider their own
candidate as more trustworthy than the other major party candidate, so being distrustful of both
candidates was one way to indicate low levels of trust. It could also indicate major party failure
and a higher likelihood to vote for an alternate candidate.
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Table 11.
Hillary Clinton
Coef.
Std. Err.

Evan McMullin
Coef.
Std. Err.

Other
Coef.

Std. Err.

-.58034*
-.63503*
-.00514*
-.9190*
-.5554*

.0594
.0747
.0015
.1850
.1567

1.8608*
.8316*
-.0213*
.4648*
1.0741*

.0582
.0718
.0011
.2720
.2327

-.3430*
-.4535*
-.0303*
.1255
.9763*

.0700
.0882
.0019
.2617
.2143

Independent -3.6195*
Leaning -5.564*
Republican
Weak Republican -5.4952*

.1336
.1387

-.0200
-.5555*

.2100
.2072

-.3330
-1.733*

.1925
.1949

.1469

-.7516*

.2094

-2.0937* .2067

Strong Republican -7.2878*

.1597

-1.7256*

.2079

-3.0851* .2049

.0500
.0515
.0748
.0737
.1552

-.2637*
.4752*
.1107*
.8395*
-.4446*

.0374
.0382
.0719
.0489
.2196

-.0020
.4406*
-.0994
.9140*
1.0851*

Active LDS
Not Active LDS
Age35
Weak Democrat
Leaning Democrat

Male
College
White
Distrust
Constant
Model Info
N
X2

-.3029*
.7633*
-.3680*
.1786*
4.2173*

.0595
.0605
.0902
.0744
.2128

25258
2847.97
p<0.0001
2
Pseudo r .3828
* significant at p<.05

As predicted by the cross-tabs, the model supports the theory of higher levels of support
for McMullin by members of the Church of Jesus Christ. This idea is strengthened by noting
that those same members were not more likely to support any third party candidate, just
McMullin.

35

In years.
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In addition to the “pushing away” that these these voters felt from the Republican party and
candidate Trump, McMullin also pulled them in and away from either the other major party or
from alternate third parties. This effect was seen more in those with high levels of religiosity,
but was also significant for those identifying as not active. A higher age across the board led to
greater levels of support for Trump. Along political ideology, standard behavior was found as
expected. Clinton did best among strong Democrats, and support for her fell moving down the
spectrum to Strong Republican.
McMullin did not do well with strong Republican voters, and the targeted defection is
supported here once again. Strong Republicans still turned out in force for their party candidate.
Male and White voters also showed lower levels of support for McMullin, although both of these
effects are small. Clinton, as the Democrat nominee, was stronger with women, minorities, and
those with a college education. Not surprising, both McMullin and Other candidates did well
with voters expressing distrust with both major party candidates. Clinton also fared better than
Trump among the same distrustful voters.
Independent voters were an even mix of genders and races, but favored those who were
college educated. Some evidence of strategic voting is found as those identifying as true
independents with no party leaning were not more likely to vote for McMullin or any other
party. It appears as if many who were unaffiliated with a party still chose to support Trump, but
were not as likely to cast a vote for Clinton.
It is clear that being a Latter-Day Saint and Republican was a significant indicator of
McMullin support. By examining to what extent activity level in the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints predicted support for Evan McMullin, it is also clear that the most active
members were also the most likely to defect from the party and cast a vote for McMullin.
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Conclusion
Much of the research surrounding political parties excludes third parties. This paints an
incomplete picture and minimizes the impact that third party campaigns, as well as voting third
party, has on policy. Third parties have their own unique and significant history in the United
States. They have their own advantages and deal with their own unique challenges when it
comes to furthering their policy goals. This unique impact is illustrated in the Utah 2016
presidential election.
When it comes to the impact of religion and voting behavior, Utah presents a unique and
interesting case study. This is due to the predominant religion and the intertwined history of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints with the territorial, then state, government of
Utah. Members of the church are among the most united of any voting bloc. They are also
categorized much like evangelicals by many, despite crucial differences which were illustrated in
the 2016 presidential election.
Exit poll data clearly shows the unique identity of Latter-Day Saints in Utah and how
cleavages between them and other traditional religious Republicans caused a defection from the
party where other religious groups, such as evangelicals, remained loyal to the party. Despite
Latter-Day Saint voters being some of the strongest Republican supporters for the past 50 years,
candidate Donald Trump was plagued by cleavages between Latter-Day Saint voters and other
Republicans, which caused a dramatic shift in support in the presidential election.
Donald Trump’s policy focus and behavior clearly ignited those cleavages in Utah,
resulting in a major party failure by nominating a presidential candidate who was unappealing to
the Latter-Day Saint Republicans living in Utah. If President Trump runs in 2020 as the
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Republican nominee which is likely, I would expect to see a similar defection should a viable
third party candidate appear. I also predict this to be a short-term, candidate-focused failure of
the Republican Party, and when the time comes that a more viable candidate runs under the
Republican flag, support from Utah will return. Studying future elections in Utah would be a
valuable subject of research, as would examination of the Utah Latter-Day Saint voting bloc
behavior in general.
Regarding generalizability of the findings, members of the church are a self-described
“peculiar people,” and it would be difficult to extend the hypotheses of this paper to other groups
directly. Voting behavior is influenced by a range of priorities and perceptions and the nuance of
voter preferences is lost in a simple vote choice. Due to the structure of voting in the United
States, beyond the macro winner-take-all system, each voter only has a single vote to cast, and
they must give full support to a single candidate on their ballot. The difference between a voter
who supports a candidate only 51%, and one who supports the same candidate 95% is impossible
to measure based on vote data only. The vote shift in the 2016 presidential election in Utah is an
excellent example of generally ignored group identities playing a role in vote choice.
Adaptations of Hotelling’s Theory by Black and Downs do not seem to fit the current
behavior of either major party. Both parties increasingly appeal to their respective bases, moving
further and further from the median voter. Donald Trump is clearly not a traditional Republican
nominee, and many of the current potential Democrat nominees are positioning themselves
further to the left. Although most voters in the United States eventually vote for candidates from
one of the two major parties, each major party is composed of a coalition of voters with varied
interests. The 2016 election in Utah is an example within the Republican Party in which a voting
bloc from the party chose to abandon a major party and seek representation elsewhere. It is of
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great interest that the group defecting was one that, for decades, has been a Republican party
stronghold. If the Latter-Day Saint voters were willing to defect from the party due to this
candidate selection failure, it is reasonable to assume that defections from either major party by
other groups could happen again in the future, especially if more radical or fringe candidate
selection behavior continues. The coming elections will show if Donald Trump represents a
short-term major party failure or a longer-term repositioning, a failure that would likely result in
further defection. For both major parties, the lesson to be learned in Utah is that voting blocs
can, and will, defect when their preferred positions are ignored by candidates or parties, despite
being long-time supporters in the past.
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